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CHRISTINE A. BURNS* 
Potential Game Changers Only Have Eligibility Left 
to Suit Up for a Different Kind of Court: Former 
Student-Athletes Bring Class Action Antitrust 
Lawsuit Against the NCAA  
I. Introduction 
Ed O’Bannon starred on the 1995 University of California, Los Angeles 
(“UCLA”) basketball national championship team.1 He went on to play for a few 
years in the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and now lives a comfortable 
life as a car salesman in Las Vegas.2 About three years ago, he discovered that kids in 
his neighborhood knew him because they “played him” on a classic college basket-
ball video game.3 This video game incorporates all of O’Bannon’s identifying cha-
racteristics into his video game character, with the exception of his name.4 The 
neighborhood kids learned O’Bannon’s playing style, his jersey number, and even 
his lefty jump shot, all just by playing the video game.5 O’Bannon was disturbed to 
discover that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) and its licens-
ing company, the Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”), were still profiting from 
his collegiate image and likeness 14 years after he left college without ever compen-
sating him.6 
In July 2009, O’Bannon initiated an antitrust class action lawsuit against the 
NCAA and the CLC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
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 1. See Dan Wetzel, Making NCAA Pay?, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 21, 2009), http://rivals. ya-
hoo.com/ncaa/basketball/news?slug=dw-ncaasuit072109&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (explaining Ed O’Bannon’s 
situation and the circumstances giving rise to a class action antitrust challenge brought against the NCAA by 
former NCAA student-athletes). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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nia7 on behalf of former college men’s basketball and football players, seeking un-
specified damages for the use, sale, and licensing of the former players’ images and 
likenesses in video content, photographs, and other memorabilia.8 O’Bannon’s 
complaint includes an allegation that the NCAA restrained trade in violation of § 1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) by requiring student-athletes to for-
go compensation for the use of their collegiate identity rights, even after leaving col-
lege.9 The licensing of the player images and likenesses at issue generates revenue for 
the NCAA and its institutions through a variety of technological formats, including 
video games, DVDs, photographs, stock footage used in television commercials, 
and rebroadcasts of “classic” games.10  
O’Bannon and the class of former NCAA student-athlete plaintiffs claim that the 
NCAA’s conduct is “blatantly anticompetitive and exclusionary, as it wipes out in 
total the future ownership interests of former student-athletes in their own im-
ages—rights that all other members of society enjoy—even long after student-
athletes have ceased attending a university.”11 O’Bannon and the class of plaintiffs 
seek injunctive relief permanently prohibiting the NCAA from using “Form 08-3a” 
and any similar image rights release forms.12 The class also seeks to enjoin the 
NCAA and the CLC from “selling, licensing, or using former student-athletes’ 
rights” that these entities do not own.13 
 This comment analyzes the allegations in the class action lawsuit brought by 
former NCAA student-athletes that the NCAA and its institutions violate § 1 of the 
Sherman Act by continuing to sell, license, and use student-athletes’ images and li-
kenesses after they leave collegiate competition without compensation.14 Part II ex-
amines the purpose and elements of § 1 of the Sherman Act and the two types of 
                                                                
 7. Class Action Complaint at 1, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (NCAA), Collegiate Licensing 
Co. (CLC), No. CV 09-3329 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/public 
/resources/documents/072209obannonsuit.pdf.  
 8. See id. at 8; see also Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust 
Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 22, 2009), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn. 
com/2009/writers/michael_mccann/07/21/ncaa/index.html (listing the kinds of NCAA activities the class of 
former NCAA student-athletes allege to be in violation of antitrust laws).  
 9. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 3; see also McCann, supra note 8. 
 10. Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 4. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. at 8 (stating the kind of relief the class of former NCAA student-athletes seeks against the NCAA). 
 13. Id. at 8–9. 
 14. U.S. District Court Judge Claudia Wilken recently combined a similar case brought on behalf of cur-
rent student-athletes, Keller v. EA Sports, NCAA, with O’Bannon v. NCAA, CLC, but the focus of this comment 
is the former student-athletes’ claims in O’Bannon v. NCAA, CLC. O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. CV 09-3329, 2010 
WL 445190, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
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antitrust violations under § 1 of the Sherman Act.15 Part III focuses on federal 
courts’ treatment of the NCAA under antitrust scrutiny and details the lawsuits that 
student-athletes have brought against the NCAA in recent years.16 Part IV analyzes 
the former student-athletes’ antitrust claim in light of the case law among the Su-
preme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals.17 This analysis leads to the conclusion that 
the NCAA’s zero compensation policy for continued sale, licensing, and use of for-
mer student-athletes’ images and likenesses does not likely constitute a per se § 1 
violation, but most likely restrains trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act be-
cause the policy is unreasonable under the circumstances, as its anticompetitive ef-
fects outweigh any procompetitive benefits.18 
II. Purpose and Elements of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
The Sherman Act is a federal antitrust statute that Congress enacted in 1890 to deter 
unreasonable restraints on free competition.19 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohi-
bits every “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”20 The fol-
lowing subsections discuss the purpose of the Sherman Act,21 the elements of an an-
titrust violation cause of action under § 1 of the Sherman Act,22 and the two kinds of 
Sherman Act violations: per se violations23 and agreements that courts deem viola-
tions because they constitute “unreasonable” restraints on competition after the 
three-step analysis24 under the “rule of reason” standard.25  
                                                                
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 490–93 (1940) (noting that the Sherman Act’s intended 
goal was “the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial transactions which 
tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or 
consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury”). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 24. See infra Parts II.B.2.a–c. 
 25. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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A. Purpose of the Sherman Act 
The Sherman Act was designed as a charter to protect economic liberty via protec-
tion of trade and free competition.26 A freely competitive market results in business-
es competing with each other to attract the most customers by maintaining the low-
est prices and increasing the quality of the goods or services it offers.27 Underlying 
the Sherman Act is the idea that free competition creates the best allocation of eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, and the highest quality, along with an atmos-
phere conducive to maintaining American democratic political and social institu-
tions.28 Free competition allows profit opportunities to be made by the businesses 
that have the best products and services for the lowest prices.29 The Sherman Act 
exists to prevent undue restrictions of trade, which inhibit free competition and its 
desirable results.30 
The Supreme Court of the United States explained that the purpose of the Sher-
man Act is to protect competition and the public from the failure of the market.31 
Consumers lose the benefit of a freely competitive market when businesses distort 
the allocation of resources by fixing prices or dominating the market to prevent 
competitors’ entry into the market.32 The Sherman Act was designed to prevent re-
straints to free competition in market transactions that tend to restrict production, 
raise prices, or otherwise control the marketplace to the detriment of consumers.33 
Accordingly, the Sherman Act directly protects free competition, which in turn pro-
                                                                
 26. See  N. P. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a com-
prehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
trade.”). 
 27. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm (explaining the economic results of a freely competitive 
market). 
 28. See N. P. R. Co., 356 U.S. at 4 (noting how the “unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material 
progress, wh le at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic 
political and social institutions”). 
 29. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm (describing the incentives businesses have in a freely 
competitive market). 
 30. See Nw. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d. 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943) (explaining that the 
Sherman Act and antitrust laws were “intended to advance the public welfare by promoting free competition 
and preventing undue restriction of trade and commerce”). 
 31. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
 32. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.htm (explaining how restrictions on a freely competitive 
market harm consumers).  
 33. See N. P. R. Co., 356 U.S. at 4. 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 395 
tects the public and businesses from the negative consequences of restricted compe-
tition. 34  
B.  Elements of an Antitrust Violation Cause of Action under § 1 of the Sherman Act  
The relevant part of § 1 of the Sherman Act reads: “Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”35 A viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act has three aspects: (1) an agreement, (2) that unrea-
sonably restrains competition, and (3) affects interstate commerce.36 There are two 
kinds of Sherman Act violations: per se violations37 and agreements that courts deem 
violations because they constitute “unreasonable” restraints on competition under 
the “rule of reason” standard.38 
C.  Per Se Violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act Are Illegal Trade Restraints 
Per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act occur when “surrounding circumstances 
make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified 
further examination of the challenged conduct.”39 An action restraining trade con-
stitutes a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act when it always or almost always 
tends to inhibit competition and output.40 Current per se violation categories in-
clude agreements resulting in horizontal market division, horizontal price fixing, 
and horizontal boycotts.41  
For example, in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia,42 the United States Supreme Court 
held that two bar review course competitors’ agreement to allocate the Georgia bar 
review course market to one of them was horizontal market division and a per se 
                                                                
 34. See id. (explaining that the “policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition”). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 36. See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 37. See infra Part II.B.1.  
 38. See infra Part II.B.2; see also Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (ex-
plaining that under rule of reason analysis, the court determines “whether the restraints in the agreement are 
reasonable in light of their actual effects on the market and their pro-competitive justifications”). 
 39. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984). 
 40. See Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 (2007) (explaining that courts 
only resort to per se rules when a restraint on trade is always or almost always going to restrict competition and 
decrease output). 
 41. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 55 (6th ed. 2007); see infra notes 42–
49 and accompanying text. Vertical price fixing is no longer a per se violation of the Sherman Act and should be 
analyzed under the rule of reason. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882 (“[V]ertical price restraints are to be judged by the 
rule of reason.”). 
 42. 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
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violation of the Sherman Act because the anticompetitive effect of the arrangement 
was clear; the price for the review course immediately increased by $250 after the 
agreement.43 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,44 the Supreme Court ruled 
that major oil companies’ agreement to purchase surplus gasoline from indepen-
dent refiners in a spot market to prevent dramatic price decreases was per se illegal 
under the Sherman Act as price fixing among competitors, even without a direct 
agreement on the specific prices to be maintained.45 The Supreme Court held in 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association46 that an agreement between a 
group of attorneys not to work for wages that they considered to be too low was a 
boycott, and thus was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.47 A horizontal 
boycott is an agreement between a group of competitors not to deal with individu-
als or companies outside the group, deal only on certain terms, or coerce suppliers 
or customers not to deal with a boycotted competitor.48 When alleging a per se vi-
olation, the party bringing the claim must prove that the alleged conduct occurred 
and that the conduct resulted in restraints that have manifestly anticompetitive ef-
fects that lack any redeeming value.49 
Agreements are per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act if they are unreasona-
ble as a matter of law, which means the agreements always tend to restrict competi-
tion or output and result in higher prices.50 The Supreme Court has noted that 
courts do not classify business relationships or agreements as per se violations of the 
Sherman Act without having considerable experience with those kinds of relation-
ships or agreements.51 However, recognized per se Sherman Act violation categories 
are not fixed over time and may shift in response to new circumstances or new judi-
cial thought.52 
                                                                
 43. Id. at 47–49. 
 44. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 45. Id. at 198, 218, 222. 
 46. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 47. Id. at 414, 436. 
 48. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (“Group boycotts, or concerted re-
fusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.”). 
 49. See Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (internal citations omit-
ted) (“To justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have ‘manifestly anticompetitive’ effects and ‘lack . . . any 
redeeming virtue’.”). 
 50. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886; see discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 51. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (“It is only after considerable 
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman 
Act.”), abrogated on other grounds by In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
 52. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882 (holding that vertical price fixing is no longer a per se violation category); id. 
at 899–900 (explaining how it would not make sense to allow the rule of reason to evolve with new circums-
tances without also allowing the line of per se illegality to shift with new circumstances or wisdom). 
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D. The “Rule of Reason” Determines Which Non-Per Se Violation Trade Restraints 
Are Illegal  
If the Supreme Court does not currently recognize the agreement under an existing 
per se violation category, the agreement may still violate § 1 of the Sherman Act if 
the restrained trade is deemed “unreasonable” under the circumstances.53 While 
many contracts restrain trade to some degree, courts evaluate whether it is in viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act by using “rule of reason” analysis, which involves 
three steps: (1) the plaintiff must meet its burden of showing that the agreement 
resulted in an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant mar-
ket; (2) if the plaintiff meets its burden in the first step, then the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show the procompetitive virtues of its action; and (3) if the defendant 
meets the burden in the second step, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
prove that alternative means resulting in less restricted competition exist to achieve 
the same procompetitive effect.54 Courts hold agreements that unreasonably restrain 
trade unlawful.55  
The purpose of antitrust analysis is to judge the possible anticompetitive effect of 
the restraint.56 The rule of reason test does not involve a broad inquiry into the anti-
competitive effects of an agreement balanced against its possible social benefits, but 
rather concerns whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competi-
tion or suppresses competition.57  Accordingly, the factfinder will apply a rule of 
reason analysis to determine whether the restraints on the market are reasonable by 
weighing any anticompetitive effects against any procompetitive justifications.58 
This analysis involves considering the case’s circumstances to determine whether 
the agreement that results in restrained trade violates the Sherman Act.59 The main 
focus of rule of reason analysis is to what extent the alleged trade restraint harms 
competition, which in turn potentially harms consumers.60 For example, in Clorox 
Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc.,61 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
                                                                
 53. See id. at 885 (“The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade 
in violation of § 1.”); see discussion infra Part III.B.2.  
 54. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); see discussion infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 55. See Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56; see discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 56. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“[T]he inquiry mandated by 
the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that sup-
presses competition.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
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held that a 1987 trademark agreement between the prior owner of LYSOL and pre-
decessor-in-interest of Clorox, regulating the advertising and packaging of PINE-
SOL disinfectant products and restricting types of the product that may be sold, did 
not violate antitrust laws because it did not significantly affect any competitor’s 
ability to compete.62   
The fact-finding court must first identify the specific restraint on competition 
before considering possible anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifica-
tions.63 In the Clorox case, the court began by noting that Clorox was challenging a 
trademark agreement.64 The court discussed how trademark agreements are “com-
mon and favored, under the law” and explained that the agreement regulates how a 
competitor may use a competing mark.65 The court further explained that the 
trademark agreement at issue is not illegal per se under antitrust laws because it does 
not fall into any of the historically recognized per se illegal categories of agree-
ments.66  
1. The plaintiff must meet its burden of showing that the agreement resulted in an 
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market. 
Rule of reason analysis contains three steps.67 The first step in the rule of reason 
inquiry is for the factfinder to consider whether the plaintiff has met its burden of 
showing that the agreement resulted in an actual substantial adverse effect on com-
petition as a whole in the relevant market.68 In the Clorox case, the plaintiff, Clorox, 
had to prove that the 1987 trademark agreement harmed competition in general.69 
The Court explained that Clorox had to show more than the defendant’s conduct 
harmed them—Clorox needed to show an actual adverse effect in the relevant mar-
ket—because the antitrust laws exist to protect against unreasonable restraints of 
overall competition, not to protect competitors from making agreements that turn 
out to be unfavorable to one of the parties.70 However, in County of Tuolumne v. So-
nora Community Hospital,71 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied 
                                                                
 62. Id. at 52. 
 63. Id. at 56.  
 64. Id. at 55. 
 65. Id. at 55–56. 
 66. Id. at 56. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the 
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.”). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 57. 
 71. 236 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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the rule of reason to a hospital’s rule that created privileging criteria for which doc-
tors could perform cesarean sections (“C-sections”).72 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the hospital’s rule had the effect of foreclosing family doctors from the market, and 
found that there was an anticompetitive effect due to the fact that the hospital en-
joyed complete control of the relevant market.73 
Sometimes an agreement’s actual adverse effect on competition is so obvious 
that courts only give a “quick-look” over the first step in the rule of reason inquiry 
and hold that the agreement is unreasonable.74 “Quick-look” rule of reason analysis 
applies when the anticompetitive effect of an arrangement is obvious but does not 
qualify under an existing per se violation category.75 Although the agreement is not 
per se illegal, if the resulting trade restraint is unrelated to the purpose of the agree-
ment or obviously anticompetitive, the agreement is nevertheless unreasonable un-
less otherwise justified.76 Quick-look analysis should be applied when someone with 
even a basic understanding of economics could see that the arrangement in ques-
tion would negatively affect competition.77 Situations where quick-look analysis ap-
plies include when there are flat limits on output or refusal to provide a requested 
service.78 For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,79 
the NCAA adopted a plan that limited the total number of televised college football 
games and the number of football games that any individual college may televise, 
and prohibited NCAA member institutions from selling television rights except in 
accordance with the plan.80 The Supreme Court explained that when there is an 
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, no “elaborate industry analy-
sis” is needed to determine its anticompetitive effect.81 The Court held that the 
NCAA television plan “on its face” constituted a trade restraint that resulted in 
higher prices and lower output.82 Additionally, in F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of 
                                                                
 72. Id. at 1152, 1159. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See, e.g., California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).  
 75. See id. at 759 (explaining that when any anticompetitive effects of given restraints are not intuitively 
obvious, the rule of reason demands a more thorough examination into the restraints’ consequences on compe-
tition). 
 76. Id. at 770.  
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (describing a horizontal agreement 
among certain dentists to withhold a particular service their customers desired); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 
U.S. 85, 99–100 (1984) (explaining how the NCAA limited the number of televised games and fixed a minimum 
price). 
 79. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 80. Id. at 91–92. 
 81. Id. at 109–10. 
 82. Id. at 113. 
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Dentists,83 the Supreme Court applied quick-look rule of reason analysis to deter-
mine that a dental association rule prohibiting member dentists from submitting x-
rays to dental insurers for evaluating claims constituted an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.84 The Court held that such a rule constituted a horizontal agreement among 
the participating dentists to refuse to provide their customers with the requested 
service of forwarding x-rays to insurance companies to supplement claims forms 
and noted that industry analysis was not required to show the anticompetitive na-
ture of the agreement.85 
2. If the plaintiff meets its burden in the first step, then the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show the procompetitive virtues of its action. 
According to a recent empirical study (the “Carrier study”) on courts’ applications 
of the rule of reason, courts dispose of 97% of cases at the first step in the analysis 
because they find there is no anticompetitive effect.86 If, however, the plaintiff meets 
the burden in the first step, then the burden shifts to the defendant in the second 
step.87 In the second step, the defendant must show “pro-competitive redeeming 
virtues” of its action.88 The party accused of anticompetitive behavior in violation of 
the Sherman Act has the “heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which 
competitively justifies [the] apparent deviation from the operations of a free mar-
ket.”89 Accordingly, under the second step of rule of reason analysis, the factfinder 
considers whether the defendant has presented evidence to sufficiently establish the 
procompetitive virtues of its challenged action.90 In the Clorox case, the Court held 
that Clorox did not meet the burden of showing that the 1987 trademark agreement 
could significantly affect competition as a whole, so it was accordingly irrelevant 
whether procompetitive justifications for the agreement existed.91 The Court dis-
cussed the procompetitive justifications of trademark agreements, such as how they 
are a means by which parties agree to market products to reduce the likelihood of 
                                                                
 83. 476 U.S. at 447. 
 84. Id. at 459. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 827, 828 (2009) (“Courts dispose of 97% of cases at the first stage, on the grounds that there is no anti-
competitive effect. They balance in only 2% of cases.”). 
 87. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 59 (1997) (“Only if a plaintiff succeeds in establish-
ing the actual adverse effects of an alleged restraint does the burden shift to the defendant to establish its pro-
competitive redeeming virtues.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984). 
 90. Clorox, 117 F.3d at 59. 
 91. Id. at 59–60. 
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consumer confusion, and concluded that the procompetitive justifications sup-
ported its conclusion that the arms-length agreement did not violate antitrust 
laws.92 However, in the Sonora Community Hospital case, the Ninth Circuit accepted 
the defendant hospital’s procompetitive justification for its rule that created privi-
leging criteria.93 The Ninth Circuit explained that the procompetitive effect of re-
quiring the doctors that perform the procedures to have certain training—
optimizing patients’ health—outweighed the rule’s anticompetitive effect.94  
3. If the defendant meets the burden in the second step, then the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff to prove that alternative means resulting in less restricted competition exist 
to achieve the same procompetitive effect.   
According to the Carrier study, courts have ultimately disposed of zero rule of rea-
son cases at the second step—the “no procompetitive justification” stage—and only 
0.5% of such cases because of an unrebutted procompetitive justification.95 These 
low statistics make it more difficult to predict how courts will analyze cases that 
proceed beyond the first step of the rule of reason analysis.96 If the defendant meets 
its burden in the second step, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove 
that alternative means resulting in less restricted competition exist to achieve the 
same procompetitive effect.97 In the Sonora Community Hospital case, the plaintiff 
presented suggestions for less restrictive alternatives to the hospital’s anticompeti-
tive rule, but the Ninth Circuit was not satisfied with the alternatives because they 
required additional information from doctors and significantly increased cost.98 The 
Carrier study noted that courts have ultimately disposed of 0.5% of rule of reason 
cases at the third step, the “no less restrictive alternative” stage.99 In all three steps of 
the rule of reason analytical framework, the essential concern is whether the re-
strained trade harms or potentially harms competition.100  
                                                                
 92. Id. at 60. 
 93. Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Carrier, supra note 86, at 829 (stating that of 222 cases involving a court’s final determination in a rule 
of reason case, courts disposed of zero cases at the “no procompetitive justification” stage, and only one at the 
“unrebutted procompetitive justification” stage). 
 96. See generally id. at 829–30. 
 97. Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56 (internal citation omitted) (“Should the defendant carry this burden, the plain-
tiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative means that is 
less restrictive of competition.”). 
 98. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d at 1159–60. 
 99. Carrier, supra note 86, at 829. 
 100. Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57 (“The antitrust laws protect consumers by prohibiting agreements that unrea-
sonably restrain overall competition . . . .”). 
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After completion of this third step, courts balance anticompetitive and procom-
petitive effects.101 In the Sonora Community Hospital case, after analyzing the third 
step, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to balance the anticompetitive harms of the hos-
pital’s rule that created privileging criteria for C-sections (foreclosing family doctors 
from the market) against the procompetitive effects of the hospital’s rule (maintain-
ing the quality of patient care that it provides) and held that the procompetitive ef-
fects offset any anticompetitive harm.102 However, courts almost never get to the 
point of balancing these effects, as the vast majority of case analyses under the rule 
of reason end before the third step.103  
Notably, there is no bright line separating per se analysis from rule of reason 
analysis.104 Courts’ analyses are shifting from per se analysis to the rule of reason.105 
In practice, application of the per se rule “may require considerable inquiry into 
market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive 
conduct.”106 Categories of per se violations may change as economic circumstances 
change.107 No matter whether the finding results from a per se presumption or actual 
market analysis using the rule of reason, the judicial inquiry under the Sherman Act 
involves how the restraint affects competition.108 
 
 
III.  The Current State of the Law: The NCAA is Not Immune to 
Antitrust Scrutiny 
The Sherman Act is treated as a common law statute.109 Just as common law evolves 
to adapt to “modern understanding and greater experience,” as a common law sta-
tute, the Sherman Act’s ban of unreasonable trade restraints adapts to meet the dy-
                                                                
 101. See, e.g., Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d at 1160. 
 102. Id. at 1152, 1160; see Carrier, supra note 86, at 832. 
 103. See Carrier, supra note 86, at 828 (“They balance in only 2% of cases.”). 
 104. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 at n.26 (“[T]here is often no bright line separating per se 
from Rule of Reason analysis.”). 
 105. Carrier, supra note 86, at 828 (“Because analysis is migrating away from per se analysis and towards the 
rule of reason, an exploration of what courts actually do in applying the framework may prove useful.”).  See, 
e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (striking down vertical price 
fixing as a per se category). 
 106. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26. 
 107. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (explaining that stare decisis does not necessitate adherence to any per se rule 
and how the rule of reason’s case-by-case adjudication implements the Sherman Act’s treatment as a common 
law statute). 
 108. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.   
 109. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899. 
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namics of the current economic landscape.110 The courts determine whether re-
straining trade is “unreasonable” to the point of illegality under the Sherman Act on 
a case-by-case basis.111 The NCAA, an association of schools that compete against 
each other to attract revenue, fans, and student-athletes, and its licensing company, 
the CLC, fall within § 1 of the Sherman Act’s domain.112 This section describes how 
the NCAA is no longer immune from antitrust lawsuits and details the lawsuits that 
student-athletes have brought against the NCAA in recent years. 
A. The NCAA Is Subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act 
Previously, the NCAA maintained immunity from lawsuits brought under federal 
antitrust laws because the laws were generally not applicable to self-regulatory or-
ganizations with noncommercial goals.113 However, judicial antitrust treatment of 
the NCAA changed in 1975 in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,114 when the Supreme 
Court held that professional self-regulatory organizations are not immune from an-
titrust scrutiny.115 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,116 the 
Supreme Court stated that when NCAA rules restrain competition in terms of price 
and output, a fair evaluation of the rules’ competitive character requires considera-
tion of the NCAA’s justifications for the restraints.117  
The Supreme Court considered the competitive effects of NCAA actions alleged-
ly restraining trade before finding that the actions violated the Sherman Act.118 
The Court applied rule of reason analysis to NCAA regulations and held that an 
NCAA rule is “procompetitive” if it is a “justifiable means of fostering competition 
                                                                
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. See generally NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 (explaining the role of the NCAA); Note, Sherman Act Invalidation 
of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1301 at n.9 (1992) (listing cases where the NCAA was 
subject to antitrust scrutiny).   
 113. See Christopher L. Chin, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA’s Unlawful Restraint of the Student-Athlete, 26 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (1993) (explaining that before Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the NCAA’s immunity 
to antitrust challenges was justified because the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to self-regulatory or-
ganizations with noncommercial goals and activities). 
 114. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 115. Id. at 787 (holding that the nature of an occupation does not alone provide immunity from the Sher-
man Act and explaining that “Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of the Sherman Act, and 
to read into it so wide an exemption . . . would be at odds with that purpose”). 
 116. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 117. Id. at 120 (holding that NCAA rules that restrict output are not consistent with the NCAA’s role of 
preserving and enhancing the tradition of intercollegiate athletics in American life). See also Sherman Act Invali-
dation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, supra note 112 (“NCAA rules should be upheld if they increase economic 
marketplace competition by preserving the distinct product of college sports.”). 
 118. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 120. 
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among amateur athletic teams.”119 An NCAA rule does not violate the Sherman Act 
if it is tailored to the goal of preserving the product of intercollegiate sports in the 
economic marketplace.120  
B. NCAA Student-Athletes Have Brought Claims against the NCAA in Recent Years 
Recently there have been claims brought by student-athletes against the NCAA.121 
For example, in Bloom v. NCAA,122 star college football player Jeremy Bloom sued 
the NCAA for declaratory and injunctive relief against the NCAA’s prohibition of 
student-athletes receiving endorsements.123 Bloom represented the United States in 
two Winter Olympics in moguls skiing before playing football for the University of 
Colorado from 2002 to 2003.124 He had various commercial endorsements before 
joining the football team and wished to continue his endorsements while he was a 
student-athlete to fund his skiing career.125 While the Bloom case did not involve 
trade restraint claims in violation of antitrust laws,126 it is significant because the 
Colorado Court of Appeals held that student-athletes have standing to sue the 
NCAA because they are third-party beneficiaries to the contract between the NCAA 
and its member institutions.127 The Court ultimately did not grant Bloom relief, 
finding that Bloom could not prove that the NCAA had inconsistently applied or 
unfairly interpreted its rules.128 
Most recently, former Arizona State and Nebraska quarterback Sam Keller filed a 
class action antitrust lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in San Francisco.129 Keller 
claimed that EA Sports video games make illegal use of football and basketball play-
ers’ names and unidentified, but obvious, likenesses and that the NCAA condones 
                                                                
 119. Id. at 117 (explaining that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of foster-
ing competition among amateur collegiate teams, and therefore “procompetitive,” in that they enhance public 
interest in intercollegiate athletics, but also noting that restraints on telecasts of games are not the same as rules 
that are necessary to foster competition among the teams, such as the rules that define the conditions of the 
games, like the eligibility of participants). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Joel Eckert, Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
905, 912 (2006). 
 122. 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 123. Id. at 622; see also Eckert, supra note 121, at 913. 
 124. See Eckert, supra note 121, at 906. 
 125. Id.  
 126. See Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623 (“Although Bloom refers to his restraint of trade claim in a footnote in the 
opening brief, this reference is insufficient to warrant review of that claim.”). 
 127. Id. at 623–24. 
 128. Id. at 627–28; see also Eckert, supra note 121, at 923. 
 129. See Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).  
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this use in violation of its own rules.130 On February 8, 2010, U.S. District Court 
Judge Claudia Wilken combined the Keller and O’Bannon class action suits against 
the NCAA.131 O’Bannon and the class of former student-athletes argue that once a 
player leaves collegiate competition, he should control his own collegiate image and 
likeness and accordingly, receive royalties from its use.132 O'Bannon requests that 
the NCAA establish a constructive trust for any resulting damages or compensation 
arising from the adjudication, which would be made available to current players 
upon leaving college.133  
IV. Analysis of the Former NCAA Student-Athletes’ Allegations:   
The NCAA’s Zero Compensation Policy for Former Student-Athletes 
Unreasonably Restrains Trade in Violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act 
The NCAA uses the CLC to license student-athletes’ images to companies selling 
merchandise nationwide.134 The NCAA does not compensate student-athletes for 
the licensing of their images while they are in college, nor after their collegiate 
sports careers end.135 The NCAA’s zero compensation policy for former student-
athletes does not likely constitute a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.136 
However, the NCAA’s zero compensation policy for former student-athletes results 
in restrained trade that is unreasonable under the circumstances, and therefore vi-
olates § 1 of the Sherman Act.137 
                                                                
 130. Id. at *1. But see Adderley, Brown Seek to File Brief, ESPN.COM: COLLEGE FOOTBALL (Sept. 28, 2009), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4512202 (describing how a federal judge in Los Angeles dismissed 
a similar lawsuit brought by NFL Hall of Famer Jim Brown in a U.S. District Court against EA Sports concern-
ing the use of his image in the company's “vintage” games in “Madden NFL,” ruling that video games are 
“much like realistic paintings of athletes depicted in real-life situations, which are protected by the First 
Amendment as artistic expressions”). 
 131. O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. CV 09-3329, 2010 WL 445190, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); see generally 
Keller, 2010 WL 530108.  
 132. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 4 (“Former-student athletes do not share in these [NCAA] 
revenues even though they have never given informed consent to the widespread and continued commercial 
exploitation of their images.”). 
 133. See id. at 8 (“Plaintiff further seeks an accounting of the monies received by Defendants, their co-
conspirators, and their licensees in connection with the exploitation of Damages Class members’ images, and 
the establishment of a constructive trust to benefit Damages Class members.”). 
 134. See About CLC, THE COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.nsf/ Con-
tent/aboutclc.html (stating that the Collegiate Licensing Company currently represents the NCAA). 
 135. See, e.g., Form 08-3a for the 2008-2009 academic year, University of Kentucky, 4, 
http://www.ukathletics.com/doc_lib/compliance0809_sa_statement.pdf (describing how the NCAA requires all 
student-athletes to sign “Form 08-3a” each year, which purports to require each student-athlete to relinquish 
their rights to the commercial use of their images). 
 136. See infra Part IV.A. 
 137. See infra Part IV.B. 
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The NCAA operates in both the commercial market and the noncommercial, 
educational market.138 When the NCAA acts in the commercial market, as is the case 
here, courts have subjected it to antitrust scrutiny.139 Former NCAA student-athletes 
have standing to bring an antitrust challenge against the NCAA in the instant case 
because a provision in the Sherman Act allows a private right of action for parties 
injured by an antitrust violation.140 
To be eligible to play in NCAA sports, student-athletes must sign Form 08-3a 
each year, as required by NCAA Constitution 3.2.4.6 and NCAA Bylaws 14.1.3.1 and 
30.12.141 Part IV of Form 08-3a, “Promotion of NCAA Championships, Events, Ac-
tivities or Programs,” requires the student-athlete to “authorize the NCAA [or a 
third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, local 
organizing committee)] to use” his or her “name or picture to generally promote 
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”142 Form 08-
3a creates an agreement that affects interstate commerce, and accordingly meets 
two of the three requirements to be a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.143 In ef-
fect, the authorization given by student-athletes through signing Form 08-3a allows 
the NCAA complete freedom to use an athlete’s likeness however the NCAA sees 
appropriate, including selling and licensing the image in interstate commerce with-
out compensating the student-athletes, as long as there is some link to an NCAA 
championship, event, activity, or program.144 As a result of signing Form 08-3a, stu-
                                                                
 138. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.Supp. 738, 744 (M.D.Tenn. 1990) (“[T]he NCAA, with its multimillion 
dollar annual budget, is engaged in a business venture and is not entitled to a total exemption from antitrust 
regulation on the ground that its activities and objectives are educational and are carried on for the benefit of 
amateurism.”). 
 139. Id. See also Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, supra note 112, 1301 at n.9 (1992) 
(listing cases where the NCAA was subject to antitrust scrutiny). 
 140. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district 
in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and 
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee.”).  
 141. See, e.g., Form 08-3a, supra note 135, at 1 (stating that Form 08-3a must be signed and returned to the 
student-athlete’s sports director before the student-athlete competes each year, as required by NCAA Constitu-
tion 3.2.4.6. and NCAA Bylaws 14.1.3.1 and 30.12). 
 142. Id. at 4.  
 143. The NCAA licenses the collegiate images of former student-athletes to companies that sell products in 
interstate commerce. See Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and 
the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 15 (2009) (explaining the current state 
of NCAA exclusive licensing); see also discussion supra Part.II.B. Discussion and analysis concerning the third 
requirement, that the agreement be one that unreasonably restrains trade, is found in Parts IV.A–B. 
 144. See, e.g., Form 08-3a, supra note 135, at 4 (stating in Part IV that by signing, the student-athlete is au-
thorizing “the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, local 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 407 
dent-athletes have no control over and receive no compensation for the future 
commercial use of their collegiate images and likenesses.145 As Form 08-3a Part IV 
does not include a time frame, it apparently requires the student-athlete to relin-
quish all rights in perpetuity to the commercial use of his or her image.146 
A.  The NCAA’s Zero Compensation Policy for Former Student-Athletes Does Not 
Likely Constitute a Per Se Violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act 
Restraints that are per se illegal are always or almost always likely to raise prices 
or reduce output, quality, service, innovation, or competition and include “agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack 
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.”147 Here, 
O’Bannon alleges that the NCAA’s conduct is “blatantly anticompetitive and exclu-
sionary.”148 Instead of individual athletes negotiating with EA Sports, television net-
works, and memorabilia companies, the NCAA uses the control it obtains via Form 
08-3a to negotiate collegiate image licensing with these parties.149 However, the 
agreement created by Form 08-3a does not fall under any of the current per se illegal 
categories—horizontal price fixing, horizontal market division, or boycotts—to be 
conclusively presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of competition.150 Form 08-
3a does not result in either horizontal market division or horizontal price fixing be-
cause the agreement it forms is not horizontal, as it is between the NCAA and the 
student-athlete, not between competitors.151 Additionally, Form 08-3a does not 
form a boycott because it is not an agreement between a group of competitors not 
to deal with individuals or companies outside the group, deal only on certain terms, 
                                                                                                                                                    
organizing committee)] to use” the student-athlete’s “name or picture to generally promote NCAA champion-
ships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”). 
 145. See Wetzel, supra note 1 (explaining Ed O’Bannon’s situation and the circumstances giving rise to a 
class action antitrust challenge brought against the NCAA by former NCAA student-athletes). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See N. P. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 148. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 3 (alleging how the NCAA has unreasonably and illegally 
restrained trade to commercially exploit former student-athletes by eliminating future ownership interests of 
former student-athletes in their own images). 
 149. See generally Form 08-3a, supra note 135, at 4 (stating in Part IV that the NCAA seeks student-athlete 
authorization to use the student-athlete’s name or picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other 
NCAA events, activities or programs). 
 150. See infra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
 151. See generally Form 08-3a, supra note 135 (serving as the contract between the NCAA and its student-
athletes). 
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or coerce suppliers or customers not to deal with a boycotted competitor.152 Per se 
violations happen when circumstances cause the likelihood of anticompetitive con-
duct to be so high that the court does not need to examine the challenged con-
duct.153  
Even if the NCAA student-athlete agreements were per se illegal, the NCAA 
could still avoid liability if the agreement created procompetitive effects that could 
not exist without an agreement.154 However, the procompetitive effects of preserving 
the goals of the NCAA, such as maintaining amateurism in collegiate sports and us-
ing players’ images to promote intercollegiate sporting events and products could 
exist without requiring student-athletes to sign away their collegiate publicity rights 
forever.155 For instance, the NCAA could be more specific in Form 08-3a to contract 
with student-athletes for the use and licensing of their collegiate images for a certain 
limited time period, such as up to five years after they leave their respective schools. 
This way, the NCAA could still use recent collegiate images of former student-
athletes to promote NCAA events and products and maintain current student-
athletes’ amateurism, without also infringing on former student-athletes’ publicity 
rights beyond that limited time period. Once this contracted time passes, then the 
NCAA should be required to enter negotiations with former student-athletes con-
cerning compensation for the continued use and licensing of their collegiate images. 
Alternatively, the NCAA could avoid such negotiations by compensating former 
student-athletes by establishing funds for health insurance, providing educational 
or vocational training, or forming pension plans.  
                                                                
 152. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S. 411, 414, 436 (1990) (holding that an agreement 
between a group of attorneys not to work for wages that they considered to be too low was a per se violation of § 
1 of the Sherman Act). 
 153. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46, 47, 50 (1990) (holding that a $250 product price in-
crease made the anticompetitive effect of the arrangement so clear as to render it a per se violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 251–53 (1940) (holding that an agree-
ment to purchase surplus product in a spot market to prevent dramatic price decreases was a per se violation of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 154. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (explaining how the NCAA markets compe-
tition itself and how the NCAA would be completely ineffective if there were no rules to which competitors 
agreed concerning the creation and definition of the competition to be marketed). But see id. at n.23 (“While as 
the guardian of an important American tradition, the NCAA’s motives must be accorded a respectful presump-
tion of validity, it is nevertheless well settled that good motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive 
practice.”). 
 155. See generally Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 8 (listing examples of alternative ways for the 
NCAA to fulfill its procompetitive goals without forever depriving former student-athletes compensation for 
use of their collegiate images, such as “establishment of funds for health insurance, additional educational or 
vocational training, and/or pension plans to benefit former student athletes”). 
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B.  The NCAA’s Zero Compensation Policy for Former Student-Athletes Results in 
Restrained Trade That Is Unreasonable under the Circumstances  
The court will apply three steps in the rule of reason inquiry to determine 
whether the NCAA’s zero compensation policy for former student-athletes results 
in restrained trade that is unreasonable under the circumstances.  
 
1.  Step One: Burden on Plaintiff to Show Agreement’s Adverse Effect  on Relevant 
Market as a Whole156 
The first step in the rule of reason inquiry is to consider whether the plaintiff has 
met the burden of showing that the agreement actually adversely affected competi-
tion as a whole in the relevant market.157 Here, O’Bannon and the class of former 
student-athlete plaintiffs should be able to prove that the zero compensation 
agreement resulting from the requirement that student-athletes sign Form 08-3a 
results in an actual and substantial adverse effect on competition.158 Without Form 
08-3a eliminating image use compensation for former student-athletes, these indi-
viduals could negotiate licensing deals with various competitors beyond the com-
panies with which the NCAA has lucrative exclusivity deals.159 For instance, instead 
of being limited to the NCAA’s deal with EA Sports, former student-athletes could 
negotiate deals with competing video game developers, publishers, and distributors, 
such as 2K Sports, Activision Blizzard, Take-Two Interactive Software, or Microsoft 
Game Studios.160 
 
2. Step Two: Burden on Defendant to Show Procompetitive Virtues of  Its Action161 
Once the class of former student-athletes meets the burden in the first step of the 
rule of reason analysis, then the burden shifts to the NCAA and the CLC in the 
second step.162 The NCAA and the CLC must show “pro-competitive redeeming vir-
                                                                
 156. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 157. Id.  
 158. See generally Kaburakis et al., supra note 143, at 15 (explaining the current state of NCAA exclusive 
licensing). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See About Us, 2K SPORTS (2008–2009), http://2ksports.com/info/about; Corporate Overview, TAKE-TWO 
INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, http://ir.take2games.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=86428&p=irol-irhome; Microsoft Game 
Studios, http://www.microsoft.com/games/; Our Company, ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, 
http://www.activisionblizzard.com//corp/b/aboutUs/ourCompany.html.  
 161. Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56. 
 162. Id. 
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tues” of its action.163 The NCAA will likely argue that the procompetitive redeeming 
virtues of its action include maintaining the four objectives it lists for its licensing 
program.164 These four objectives are: (1) to “[e]nsure the quality and consistency of 
all of the NCAA’s Championship Event merchandise”; (2) to “[p]rotect all service 
marks, trademarks, and verbiage that relates to the NCAA (or have come to be asso-
ciated with the NCAA), and to ensure that the use of these marks reflects on the 
NCAA in a favorable manner”; (3) to “[p]roduce revenue to support and enhance 
NCAA programs and to fund scholarships, programs or services to student-
athletes” of NCAA member schools and conferences; and (4) to “[p]rotect the con-
sumer from faulty or inferior products bearing the NCAA’s trademarks.”165   
The NCAA requirement that student-athletes sign over their publicity rights for 
the period that they compete in NCAA sports follows from the NCAA requirement 
that student-athletes maintain amateurism.166 The class of current student-athletes 
added to the lawsuit from the Keller case would need to defeat amateurism as an an-
titrust defense.167 However, not compensating former student-athletes for the con-
tinued commercial use of their images is not tailored to the goal of preserving col-
lege sports in the economic marketplace because the NCAA amateurism 
requirement only exists while the student-athlete plays in the NCAA.168 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that an NCAA bylaw does not violate the Sherman Act if it 
is tailored to the goal of preserving the product of college sports in the market.169 
However, the NCAA regulation of the licensing of former student-athletes’ images 
is not on a level of necessity for the NCAA to regulate as, for example, the number 
of coaches a school may hire, the recruitment process, student eligibility, and the 
                                                                
 163. Id. 
 164. See NCAA Licensing Program: Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa. 
org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/corp_relations/CorpRel/Corporate+Relationships/Li
censing/faqs.html#1.Whyhavealicensingprogram (listing the NCAA licensing program’s four main objectives). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Chin, supra note 113, at 1217 (stating that the NCAA’s goal of ensuring that intercollegiate athletics 
are distinct from professional sports is proper because in theory a student-athlete’s main concern should be to 
obtain an education, rather than generate revenue or make money). 
 167. See generally Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Anti-
trust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 32–34 (2001) (describing the likely 
judicial rule of reason analysis of the NCAA’s compensation policies). 
 168. See, e.g., Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004).  
 169. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984) (explaining that the NCAA television plan at issue 
in the case was not tailored to the goal of preserving intercollegiate sports in the marketplace because the plan 
does not regulate to produce equal ty throughout the NCAA); see also Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA 
Amateurism Rules, supra note 112, at 1307 (“[A]n NCAA bylaw will withstand antitrust attack if it is ‘tailored to 
the goal’ of preserving the ‘product’ of college sports in the economic marketplace.”). 
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number of games played, which have all been recognized by the Supreme Court as 
regulations necessary for the preservation of intercollegiate athletics.170  
3. Step Three: Burden on Plaintiffs to Prove Less Restrictive Alternatives Exist to 
Achieve Same Procompetitive Effect171 
If the NCAA and the CLC meet their burden in the second step, then the burden 
shifts back to the class of former student-athletes to prove that alternative means 
resulting in less restricted competition exist to achieve the same procompetitive ef-
fect.172 The class of former student-athletes would most likely be able to meet this 
burden because the procompetitive effects of maintaining amateurism in collegiate 
sports and using collegiate images to promote NCAA events and products could ex-
ist without requiring student-athletes to sign away their publicity rights in perpetui-
ty.173 There are various reasonable, less restrictive alternative means of achieving the 
same procompetitive effects of maintaining the quality of NCAA-licensed collegiate 
images in the market, protecting consumers, and producing revenue to support 
current student-athletes, while also compensating former student-athletes.174 For 
instance, the NCAA could compensate former student-athletes by establishing 
funds for health insurance, providing educational or vocational training, or forming 
pension plans.175 Additionally, as proposed earlier in this comment, the NCAA 
could also be more specific in Form 08-3a to contract with student-athletes for the 
use and licensing of their collegiate images for a certain limited time period, such as 
up to five years after they leave their respective schools. This would mean that the 
NCAA could still promote NCAA events and products with the recent collegiate 
images of former student-athletes and maintain current student-athletes’ amateur-
ism, without also infringing on former student-athletes’ publicity rights beyond that 
limited time period. Once this contracted time passes, the NCAA would then need 
                                                                
 170. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 122–23 (White, J., dissenting) (explaining the NCAA’s goal of preserving inter-
collegiate athletics and how many of the NCAA’s regulations would not be permitted in a traditional business 
setting, but are allowed in order for the NCAA to achieve its goals because intercollegiate athletics could not 
exist in a freely competitive market). 
 171. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 122–23 (White, J., dissenting) (explaining that the NCAA regulations not sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny are those required for organized intercollegiate athletic competition to exist); see also 
Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 8 (listing examples of alternative ways for the NCAA to fulfill its pro-
competitive goals, such as “establishment of funds for health insurance, additional education or vocational 
training, and/or pension plans to benefit former student athletes”). 
 174. Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 8; see also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 175. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 8. 
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to enter negotiations with former student-athletes pertaining to compensation for 
the continued use and licensing of their collegiate images. 
The ultimate restraint on competition in this situation is the combination of the 
NCAA having exclusive rights to the former student-athletes’ images through Form 
08-3a and the NCAA, via the CLC, granting exclusive licenses to these images.176 The 
NCAA granted exclusive licenses to NCAA basketball and football to EA Sports.177 
In 2005, the CLC made an exclusive deal with EA Sports, in which EA Sports holds 
the rights to the “teams, stadiums, and schools” for all video game consoles.178 An 
expanded argument to include these two levels of exclusivity would likely be suc-
cessful because the essential concern underlying the rule of reason analytical frame-
work is whether the action resulting in restrained trade harms competition.179  
Without Form 08-3a, former student-athletes could promote competition by in-
dividually negotiating the licensing of their collegiate images with video game and 
media companies beyond the ones with which the NCAA has exclusive deals.180 The 
combination of Form 08-3a and the NCAA’s exclusivity deals with EA Sports harms 
competition.181 EA Sports faced a competitor, 2K Sports, in NCAA basketball licens-
ing through the mid-2000s.182 2K Sports canceled its NCAA basketball series in Jan-
uary 2008 after ending negotiations with the CLC.183 EA Sports representatives 
stated that 2K Sports “walked away from college basketball,” but sports bloggers 
claimed that EA Sports influenced the CLC to increase the demanded price of the 
                                                                
 176. See generally Kaburakis et al., supra note 143, at 2 (stating that EA Sports holds exclusive licenses to 
NCAA basketball and football); Form 08-3a, supra note 135, at 4 (stating in Part IV that by signing, the student-
athlete is authorizing the “NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, confe-
rence, local organizing committee)] to use [the student-athlete’s] name or picture to generally promote NCAA 
championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs”). 
 177. See Kaburakis et al., supra note 143, at 2. 
 178. Id. (explaining the exclusivity deal between the NCAA and EA Sports). 
 179. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (noting that the purpose of the 
Sherman Act is “not to protect businesses from the working of the market,” but rather “to protect the public 
from the failure of the market”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 490–93 (1940) (noting that the 
Sherman Act’s intended goal was “the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial 
transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment 
of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of 
public injury”); Nw. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d. 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943) (explaining that the 
Sherman Act and antitrust laws were “intended to advance the public welfare by promoting free competition 
and preventing undue restriction of trade and commerce”).  
 180. See generally Kaburakis et al., supra note 143, at 15 (explaining the exclusivity deal between the NCAA 
and EA Sports). 
 181. See id. (explaining the exclusiv ty deal between the NCAA and EA Sports and the situation surrounding 
EA Sports’ previous competitor for college basketball licensing, 2K Sports).  
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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NCAA basketball license.184 More information about the NCAA’s licensing contracts 
and activities would be necessary to conclusively determine whether unreasonable 
vertical price fixing occurred between the NCAA and EA Sports in violation of the 
Sherman Act.  
When interpreting the Sherman Act, courts are not bound by formal concep-
tions of contract law, but rather look to the economics of the relevant agreements.185 
Thus, an argument from the NCAA that Form 08-3a creates a valid contract does 
not make the agreement immune from antitrust scrutiny.186 The NCAA require-
ment that student-athletes sign away their economic right to their collegiate images 
and likenesses forever amounts to restrained trade unreasonable under the circums-
tances.187 Absent the requirement, NCAA student-athletes could negotiate the li-
censing of their likeness and image rights to various media and memorabilia com-
petitors after leaving college, without undermining the NCAA’s goal of preserving 
intercollegiate athletics.188 The contracts between the NCAA and its student-athletes 
unreasonably limit student-athletes’ economic rights after their collegiate sports ca-
reers end because they are not necessary to preserve the procompetitive benefits 
underlying the NCAA’s existence and less restrictive procompetitive alternatives ex-
ist.189   
C. Possible Impacts of the Case 
There are various potential implications of the O’Bannon decision.190 There is a $4 
billion annual market for collegiate licensed merchandise that stands to be affected 
                                                                
 184. Id. See, e.g., Tom Magrino, College Hoops 2K9 Ejected, GAMESPOT.COM (Jan. 14, 2008), 
http://www.gamespot.com/xbox360/sports/collegehoops2k8/news.html?sid=6184658 (suggesting that the 
breakdown in negotiations between the NCAA and 2K Sports resulted from the outside influence of EA Sports). 
 185. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 208 (1968) (explaining that 
courts are not bound to formal conceptions of contract law when interpreting antitrust laws and must instead 
consider “the economic reality of the relevant transactions”).   
 186. Id. 
 187. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 118–19 (1984) (explaining that the NCAA television plan at 
issue in the case was not tailored to the goal of preserving intercollegiate sports in the marketplace because the 
plan does not regulate to produce equality throughout the NCAA).  
 188. See Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, supra note 112, 1307 (1992) (“[A]n 
NCAA bylaw will withstand antitrust attack if it is ‘tailored to the goal’ of preserving the ‘product’ of college 
sports in the economic marketplace.”). 
 189. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 122–23 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the NCAA regulations not 
subject to antitrust scrutiny are the ones that are required for organized intercollegiate athletic competition to 
exist); Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 8 (listing examples of alternative ways for the NCAA to fulf ll its 
procompetitive goals, such as “establishment of funds for health insurance, additional education or vocational 
training, and/or pension plans to benefit former student athletes”).  
 190. O’Bannon v. NCAA, CLC, No. CV 09-3329 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009); see infra notes 191–96 and ac-
companying text.  
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by the ruling.191 The NCAA and CLC’s financial information is private.192 Even if the 
class action lawsuit is not successful, at minimum it has the effect of making public 
the NCAA and CLC’s financial records through the discovery process, which are 
needed to uncover the exact amount of revenue generated from the licensing of 
former student-athletes’ images and likenesses.193 
Other issues arise beyond the billions of dollars of licensing fees that would be 
affected if the former student-athletes’ lawsuit is successful, including who receives 
how much compensation, in what form, and when.194 If the former student-athletes 
prevail in the suit, the NCAA would likely face changing how it handles licensing 
fees and revenue from intercollegiate sports.195 Without the NCAA’s current unrea-
sonable trade restraints, the market for such products will likely change – competi-
tion will increase over licensing deals for the images of former college stars, as each 
will negotiate his or her own image licensing with companies, which may lead to 
lower product prices for consumers.196 The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect 
such competition and to ultimately protect the public (the fans buying the video-
games and college sports memorabilia) from the failure of the market.197  
V. Conclusion 
The NCAA and the CLC’s continued commercial licensing of the collegiate images 
and likenesses of NCAA student-athletes after they leave college results in restrained 
trade unreasonable under the circumstances, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman 
                                                                
 191. See Wetzel, supra note 1 (stating that at stake is a $4 billion market for collegiate licensed merchandise, 
a market that has greatly expanded over the past 15 years); see also Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, at 29, 
35 (noting that the Collegiate Licensing Company is the market leader in collegiate licensing with more than a 
75% share of the market).  
 192. See Brian Cook, Limber Up Your Suin’ Arm, Ed O’Bannon, Because You’ve Got a Stick Now, THE 
SPORTING BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.sportingnews.com/blog/the_sporting_ 
blog/entry/view/55139/limber_up_your_suin_arm,_ed_obannon,_because_youve_got_a_stick_now. 
 193. See id.; see also Pete Thamel, N.C.A.A. Fails to Stop Licensing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at B14 
(describing how the NCAA’s licensing contracts will be open to discovery). 
 194. See Jeff Levine, Former Bruin Leads Potentially Costly Antitrust Lawsuit Against NCAA, THE BIZ OF 
BASKETBALL (July 24, 2009), http://www.bizofbasketball.com/index.php?option=com_ con-
tent&view=article&id=652:former-bruin-leads-potentially-costly-antitrust-lawsuit-against-
ncaa&catid=42:articles-a-opinion&Itemid=57 (listing the questions ESPN personality Mike Golic posed in 
reaction to the O’Bannon lawsuit: “[W]here do you draw the line?  If O’Bannon wins, who receives compensa-
tion?  Do only former athletes from revenue producing teams receive compensation?  Should only star players 
be the only former athletes compensated?  What process would govern distributing the payments?”). 
 195. Id. (noting that a successful suit for O’Bannon and the class of plaintiffs would likely change the land-
scape of the NCAA and its operations). 
 196. See supra Part IV.B. 
 197. See supra Part II.A; see also supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 415 
Act.198 It makes sense that the NCAA requires student-athletes to sign Form 08-3a, 
but it should only be a valid agreement during the period that they participate in 
collegiate competition to maintain the NCAA requirement that current student-
athletes maintain amateurism.199 Current NCAA student-athletes should remain 
amateurs during their time in collegiate competition and accordingly should not 
receive compensation for the commercial use of their images and likenesses during 
that period.200 However, once student-athletes leave collegiate competition, they 
should be compensated for the continued commercial use and licensing of their col-
legiate images.201 Protection of player likenesses once they graduate increases com-
petition within the NCAA because it adds incentive for players to leave positive leg-
acies so that their images will be featured in video games, photographs, video 
content, and other memorabilia, from which they can profit after their collegiate 
playing days end.202  
 
 
 
 
                                                                
 198. See supra Part IV.B. 
 199. See generally Chin, supra note 113, at 1217 (explaining why maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate 
athletics is proper). 
 200. Id. But see Pekron, supra note 167, at 29–30 (arguing that amateurism is not necessary to produce col-
legiate athletics and that universities should compensate student-athletes for their labors). 
 201. See supra Part IV.B. 
 202. See supra Part IV.B. 
